Report of the

School Safety Infrastructure Council

REVISED AND UPDATED TO JUNE 27, 2014



DONALD J. DEFRONZO, ***Commissioner***
THE DEPARTMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE SERVICES

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Introduction

Recognizing the need for an "all hazards" emergency preparedness and response capability, and driven by the threat of school violence in Connecticut schools and particularly by the December 14, 2012 Newtown shootings, Connecticut state government has re-evaluated its role as a partner in ensuring the safety and security of the state's local educational facilities.



For decades state government has been a primary funding source for local school construction, but has not established uniform preventative school security design standards. In practice, virtually all school safety infrastructure decisions have been made at the local level leading to school construction projects with significantly different security design features across school district boundaries. While maintaining the ability of local school boards to design facilities which are responsive to community needs and conducive to the educational process, the need to achieve a heightened and more uniform level of school safety infrastructure design in each state funded project, as provided for in Public Act 13-3, is now policy.

If the events of the recent past have taught us anything, it is that state government must use its collective resources more wisely and with greater purpose. By tying state school construction investments to local compliance with widely agreed upon security standards, state government can help achieve the goal of more secure schools through the use of preventative infrastructure design techniques.



Today state government must assume a new role and expanded responsibility.

Long a primary source of school construction funding, state government will now use its role to require a more comprehensive and uniform consideration of school security measures at the local level. By establishing a universal school security assessment process, by identifying areas of critical concern and by requiring mitigation of observed deficiencies, the state will assume greater responsibility in establishing a more uniform level of school security throughout the state.

Individually, Connecticut's 165 school districts are limited in what they can plan and achieve in moving toward the goal of improved statewide school security. However, Connecticut state government, with the commitment of its Chief Executive and legislative leadership clearly aligned, can effectively move the state forward. Acting under the provisions of P.A. 13-3 Governor Malloy has established a strong partnership with the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and has succeeded in mobilizing

national expertise to address the challenge of improving school safety infrastructure design. This partnership has brought together security experts from across federal agencies and from other states to help design and develop new tools for use in improving school safety.

Similarly, the establishment of Critical Compliance Standards and a process to ensure that local school districts meet or exceed these standards is intended to be a cooperative venture in which Connecticut municipalities and local school districts work as partners with state agencies to achieve the goal of improved school security design.

The state's role in this process does not end with funding state construction and in providing leadership in securing resources and expertise needed to improve school security. It also extends to mobilizing all affected parties in recognizing the importance of this undertaking, in sharing information and technology and in making the goal of improved school safety infrastructure a shared statewide objective. In this effort private vendors and a host of professional associations including the American Council of Engineering Companies of Connecticut, the American Institute of Architects, the Associated Builders and Contractors, the Associated General Contractors of Connecticut and the Connecticut School Construction Coalition have cooperated with the School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC) in promoting solutions to the challenging issues of improved school security design.

Finally, while the role of state government may be changing in some respects, the state's commitment to providing a warm, welcoming and nurturing educational environment in local schools is unchanged. Despite the urgency of achieving school security goals, the SSIC has recognized, from its inception, the need to preserve an educational environment that maintains an open, welcoming and supportive place for teaching and learning. The SSIC believes the framework established in this report and its associated compliance standards, will advance the cause of school security, while affording local school districts the opportunity to safeguard the local school environment which is essential to education.

Since the tragedy in Newtown, Connecticut state government has undertaken a number of initiatives to improve security in local schools. Among these efforts are two distinct requirements passed by the legislature and signed by Governor Malloy in Public Act 13-3, An Act Concerning Gun Violence Prevention and Children's Safety:

1. Development of School Safety Infrastructure Standards. P.A. 13-3, sections 80 to 83, established the School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC). This Council was comprised of nine members - the Commissioners of the Departments of Administrative Services, Education and Emergency Services and Public Protection, plus six members with varying expertise in school security related fields, appointed by legislative leaders.

   Under P.A. 13-3 the SSIC is charged with developing "…school safety infrastructure standards for school building projects under chapter 173 of general statutes and projects receiving reimbursement as part of the school security infrastructure competitive grant program." The legislation directs the SSIC to examine a variety of school building safety infrastructure areas, including entryways, ballistic glass, solid core doors, locking systems, closed circuit television monitoring, use of security cameras, classroom security and other security infrastructure features and design strategies.

These standards are to be developed by January 1, 2014 and submitted to the legislature at that time. Effective July 1, 2014, all school construction and renovation applications for state funding must comply with these standards, or they will not be approved. Additionally, state grants provided pursuant to the School Security Infrastructure Competitive Grant Program, jointly administered by the Departments of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), Education (SDE) and Administrative Services (DAS) under section 84 of P.A. 13-3, must be provided in accordance with the SSIC standards on and after these standards are submitted. Finally, any model blueprints for new school building projects that are developed by the School Building Project Advisory Council pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 10-292q must include the SSIC standards.

Appendix A of this report provides the School Safety Infrastructure Standards.

2. Development of School Security and Safety Plan Standards. P.A. 13-3 (section 86) also requires the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), in consultation with the Department of Education (SDE), to develop school security and safety plan standards to provide guidance in emergency plan management and to further assist school districts in managing practices and policies relating to school security and safety planning. These standards are intended to assist school districts in developing operational school security procedures to respond to security events.

   The template for the School Security and Safety Plan is currently being developed and will be completed by January 1, 2014.

In Connecticut the concern for school safety is not new. Safety is a consideration in virtually every school construction project. However, despite this concern, the state lacks uniform statewide methodologies for assessing and addressing school safety infrastructure design. Until now school safety has been almost entirely determined by local decision makers, leading to a very uneven and unpredictable level of school security design across school district lines.

As an alternative, a uniform comprehensive threat-assessment process and consistent standards and corresponding building plans will help ensure a threshold level of awareness, responsiveness and security.

Implicit in the authorizing legislation, and a starting point for the SSIC, is the public policy determination that schools are vulnerable facilities subject to the threat of violence with the potential for loss of life or serious injury to students and staff. Also implicit in that policy is the belief that protective school design techniques can make school grounds and school buildings safer places in which to conduct educational activities.

This report summarizes the findings of the School Safety Infrastructure Council, and covers the following areas:

Legislative Authorization
SSIC Meetings and Process

SSIC Findings & Guiding Principles
Selection and Development of a Uniform School Security Assessment Tool
Selection and Development of School Safety Infrastructure Standards
    Mandatory Compliance Areas
    Critical Compliance Areas
    Guideline Recommendations
Roll Out Plans
Appendices

Legislative Authorization

Sections 80 through 83 of P.A. 13-3, An Act Concerning Gun Violence Protection and Children's Safety, established the nine-member School Safety Infrastructure Council, and required the Council to develop school safety infrastructure standards by January 1, 2014. Effective July 1, 2014, all school construction and renovation applications for state funding must comply with these standards to be eligible for state funds. Effective upon submission, these standards will also be incorporated into model blueprints developed by the School Building Projects Advisory Council for new school building projects, and will be considered in School Security Infrastructure Competitive Grant Program approvals determined by the DESPP Commissioner.

Excerpts from Public Act No. 13-3 (Senate Bill No. 1160)
Relating to
The School Safety Infrastructure Council

SCHOOL SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE COUNCIL

Sec. 80. (NEW) (Effective from passage) (a) There is established a School Safety Infrastructure Council. The council shall consist of: (1) The Commissioner of Construction Services, or the commissioner's designee; (2) the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection, or the commissioner's designee; (3) the Commissioner of Education, or the commissioner's designee; (4) one appointed by the president pro tempore of the Senate, who shall be a person with expertise in building security, preferably school building security; (5) one appointed by the speaker of the House of Representatives, who shall be a licensed professional engineer who is a structural engineer; (6) one appointed by the majority leader of the Senate, who shall be a public school administrator certified by the State Board of Education; (7) one appointed by the majority leader of the House of Representatives, who shall be a firefighter, emergency medical technician or a paramedic; (8) one appointed by the minority leader of the Senate, who shall be a school resource officer; and (9) one appointed by the minority leader of the House of Representatives, who shall be a public school teacher certified by the State Board of Education. The Commissioner of Construction Services shall serve as the chairperson of the council. The administrative staff of the Department of Construction Services shall serve as staff for the council and assist with all ministerial duties.

(b) The School Safety Infrastructure Council shall develop school safety infrastructure standards for school building projects under chapter 173 of the general statutes and projects

receiving reimbursement as part of the school security infrastructure competitive grant program, pursuant to section 84 of this act. Such school safety infrastructure standards shall conform to industry standards for school building safety infrastructure and shall include, but not be limited to, standards regarding (1) entryways to school buildings and classrooms, such as, reinforcement of entryways, ballistic glass, solid core doors, double door access, computer-controlled electronic locks, remote locks on all entrance and exits and buzzer systems, (2) the use of cameras throughout the school building and at all entrances and exits, including the use of closed-circuit television monitoring, (3) penetration resistant vestibules, and (4) other security infrastructure improvements and devices as they become industry standards. The council shall meet at least annually to review and update, if necessary, the school safety infrastructure standards and make such standards available to local and regional boards of education.

(c) Not later than January 1, 2014, and annually thereafter, the School Safety Infrastructure Council shall submit the school safety infrastructure standards to the Commissioners of Emergency Services and Public Protection and Education, the School Building Projects Advisory Council, established pursuant to section 10-292q of the general statutes, as amended by this act, and the joint standing committees of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to public safety and education, in accordance with the provisions of section 11-4a of the general statutes.

Sec. 81. Subsection (a) of section 10-284 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2013):

(a) The Commissioner of Education shall have authority to receive and review applications for state grants under this chapter, and the Commissioner of Construction Services shall have authority to review and approve any such application, or to disapprove any such application if (1) it does not comply with the requirements of the State Fire Marshal or the Department of Public Health, (2) it is not accompanied by a life-cycle cost analysis approved by the Commissioner of Construction Services pursuant to section 16a-38, (3) it does not comply with the provisions of sections 10-290d and 10-291, (4) it does not meet (A) the standards or requirements established in regulations adopted in accordance with section 10-287c, or (B) school building categorization requirements described in section 10-283, as amended by this act, (5) the estimated construction cost exceeds the per square foot cost for schools established in regulations adopted by the Commissioner of Construction Services for the county in which the project is proposed to be located, (6) on and after July 1, 2014, the application does not comply with the school safety infrastructure standards developed by the School Safety Infrastructure Council, pursuant to section 80 of this act, or [(6)] (7) the Commissioner of Education determines that the proposed educational specifications for or theme of the project for which the applicant requests a state grant duplicates a program offered by a technical high school or an interdistrict magnet school in the same region.

Sec. 82. Subdivision (1) of subsection (a) of section 10-283 of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective July 1, 2013):

(a) (1) Each town or regional school district shall be eligible to apply for and accept grants for a school building project as provided in this chapter. Any town desiring a grant for a

public school building project may, by vote of its legislative body, authorize the board of education of such town to apply to the Commissioner of Education and to accept or reject such grant for the town. Any regional school board may vote to authorize the supervising agent of the regional school district to apply to the Commissioner of Education for and to accept or reject such grant for the district. Applications for such grants under this chapter shall be made by the superintendent of schools of such town or regional school district on the form provided and in the manner prescribed by the Commissioner of Construction Services. The application form shall require the superintendent of schools to affirm that the school district considered the maximization of natural light, [and] the use and feasibility of wireless connectivity technology and, on and after July 1, 2014, the school safety infrastructure standards, developed by the School Safety Infrastructure Council, pursuant to section 80 of this act, in projects for new construction and alteration or renovation of a school building. The Commissioner of Education shall review each grant application for a school building project for compliance with educational requirements and on the basis of categories for building projects established by the State Board of Education in accordance with this section, and shall evaluate, if appropriate, whether the project will assist the state in meeting the goals of the 2008 stipulation and order for Milo Sheff, et al. v. William A. O'Neill, et al. , provided grant applications submitted for purposes of subsection (a) of section 10-65 or section 10-76e shall be reviewed annually by the commissioner on the basis of the educational needs of the applicant. The Commissioner of Education shall forward each application and the category that the Commissioner of Education has assigned to each such project in accordance with subdivision (2) of this subsection to the Commissioner of Construction Services not later than August thirty-first of each fiscal year. The Commissioner of Construction Services shall review [all grant applications for school building projects on the basis of] each grant application for a school building project for compliance with standards for school [construction, established in regulation] building projects pursuant to regulations, adopted in accordance with section 10-287c, and, on and after July 1, 2014, the school safety infrastructure standards, developed by the School Safety Infrastructure Council pursuant to section 80 of this act. Notwithstanding the provisions of this chapter, the Board of Trustees of the Community-Technical Colleges on behalf of Quinebaug Valley Community College and Three-Rivers Community College and the following entities that will operate an interdistrict magnet school that will assist the state in meeting the goals of the 2008 stipulation and order for Milo Sheff, et al. v. William A. O'Neill, et al. , as determined by the Commissioner of Education, may apply for and shall be eligible to receive grants for school building projects pursuant to section 10-264h for such a school: (A) The Board of Trustees of the Community-Technical Colleges on behalf of a regional community-technical college, (B) the Board of Trustees of the Connecticut State University System on behalf of a state university, (C) the Board of Trustees for The University of Connecticut on behalf of the university, (D) the board of governors for an independent college or university, as defined in section 10a-37, or the equivalent of such a board, on behalf of the independent college or university, (E) cooperative arrangements pursuant to section 10-158a, and (F) any other third-party not-for-profit corporation approved by the Commissioner of Education.

Sec. 83. Subsection (b) of section 10-292q of the general statutes is repealed and the following is substituted in lieu thereof (Effective from passage):

(b) The School Building Projects Advisory Council shall (1) develop model blueprints for new school building projects that are in accordance with industry standards for school buildings and the school safety infrastructure standards, developed pursuant to section 80 of this act, (2) conduct studies, research and analyses, and (3) make recommendations for improvements to the school building projects processes to the Governor and the joint standing committee of the General Assembly having cognizance of matters relating to appropriations and the budgets of state agencies, education and finance, revenue and bonding.

This legislation established the operational framework for the work of the SSIC.

SSIC MEETINGS AND PROCESS

Members of the SSIC, appointed in the spring of 2013, began meeting in June and approved a time line dividing the Council's work into two distinct phases:

1. Public Input and Information Gathering; and
2. Analysis and Report Writing.

1. Public Input and Information Gathering

From June through September 2013, five informational meetings were conducted, the substance of which is briefly summarized below.

At its first meeting, SSIC members were informed that the state's current school building grant program has no specific security requirements, other than those inherent in the State Building Code. While security features are eligible expenditures under the grant program, there are no uniform security standards, and schools vary widely in terms of what is included in local plans.

In June, the Council heard expert testimony from the State Building Inspector, the regional Director of the National Fire Protection Association, the DESPP/DEMHS Director of Emergency Management, and representatives of the state's Office of Counter Terrorism.

In July, the Council heard from design and architectural professionals from across the state, lock experts and representatives demonstrating a new interactive-interoperable real time audio/visual communication system linking schools, public safety officials, first responders, hospitals, utility companies and others. At this session representatives of the federal Department of Homeland Security presented the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening tool (a comprehensive facilities assessment model) and discussed plans for working with SSIC and other partners to adapt its use for school security purposes.

In August, a session was dedicated to hearing from educational professionals including testimony from the state's largest teacher unions, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the Connecticut State Education Association (CSEA) and also representatives of the Connecticut Federation of School Administrators, the Connecticut Association of Public School Superintendents, the Connecticut Association of Schools, the Connecticut

Association of Boards of Education and the Connecticut Association of School Business Administrators.

A final public meeting was conducted in September for comments from public officials, police and fire professionals, first responders and members of the public. Testimony from the Hartford Chief of Police, Middletown Fire Chief and several members of the public focused on the need for effective real time emergency response communication systems, comprehensive emergency planning that balances the need for effective life safety codes compliance with planning for other threats, the need for locking devices on classroom doors, and various options concerning school windows, protective treatments and laminates.

A complete list of all those who offered comments to the SSIC is included in Appendix C.

2. Analysis and Report Writing

Beginning in October 2013, the SSIC conducted a number of working sessions involving council members, staff and invited participants. Collaboration among the three involved state agencies, the Department of Administrative Services (DAS), the State Department of Education (SDE), the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), and the federal Department of Homeland Security (DHS), along with the active participation of Council members, allowed the process to proceed on the basis of a consensus building model. Appendix C contains a complete list of Council meetings.

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Science and Technology Directorate, provided the Council with a wealth of information concerning federal efforts to assess the security of federal buildings and the process by which identified vulnerabilities are addressed. For more than a decade that office has been involved in risk assessment and risk mitigation efforts. It has also been engaged in a project to evolve the technology used for risk assessment and mitigation at the federal level so that such technology may be used by the State of Connecticut and its local school districts in assessing school security infrastructure design. Although DHS is fully engaged in this effort, completion of the IRVS for schools is not expected until mid 2014, or later. Once the adaptation is completed, it is anticipated that this emerging school facility assessment tool can be made available to school districts in Connecticut and throughout the country.

Members of the Council were also given access to various school construction standards used in other states, materials prepared by federal agencies, demonstrations of various technologies and professional staff input.

In November, several Council members traveled to Washington D.C. to meet with officials of the DHS Science and Technology Directorate to discuss the development of the school security assessment tool known as the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) program. These discussions afforded both federal and state officials the opportunity to better understand the capabilities of the IRVS and how it could be further adapted as a comprehensive assessment tool at the local level.

Finally, as it undertook its work, the Council considered the relevant recommendations of the Sandy Hook Advisory Committee. The report can be found at http://www.governor.ct.gov/malloy/lib/malloy/SHAC_Interim_Report_2013.03.18.pdf

SSIC FINDINGS & GUIDING PRINCIPLES

Based on presentations from the State Building Inspector and the Director of the Office of School Facilities, SSIC members concluded early in the process that, like many states, Connecticut's current school building grant program has no specific security requirements, with the exception of those inherent in the State Building Code. While security features are eligible expenditures under the grant program for new and renovate as new school facilities, there are no uniform safety standards, and schools vary widely in terms of what is included in local plans. As an alternative, a uniform comprehensive threat assessment process and corresponding school security infrastructure standards will help ensure a threshold level of awareness, responsiveness and security compliance in Connecticut schools. The provisions of the School Facilities Grant program (Chapter 173) will be modified to require school systems seeking state funding to certify compliance with the new School Safety Infrastructure Standards and related requirements.

Based on testimony from experts at the state, regional and federal level, the Council determined that school safety infrastructure planning should be based on an "all hazards" assessment, and that school design safety standards should encourage the use of protective infrastructure design features in all levels or layers of school facility construction including:

Site development and preparation;
Perimeter boundaries and access points;
Secondary perimeters up to the building exterior; and
the interior of the building itself.

Another important point, made repeatedly by professionals in the field, is that the conduct of these local uniform assessments must be an inclusive process involving police, fire, medical, school and other local officials. This public safety team approach is not only important in the assessment phase, but throughout the design and construction period as well. The need for redundancy and collaboration is essential.

Central to the security assessment process and the development of the School Security and Safety Plan is the need to conduct an emergency response time analysis (ERTA) to determine the actual amount of time needed for a police response to a specific school in a crisis situation. This exercise will also help in appropriate design decisions related to architectural safeguards, locking technologies and locations, and other measures that could deter or delay an intruder for an amount of time necessary to ensure an onsite public safety response prior to deep building penetration. An Emergency Response Time Analysis should be conducted for each proposed school design plan to better inform local planners on which school security design features may be appropriate for impeding the entry of unwanted individuals

or preventing or delaying the free movement of such parties in a school facility. (Knowing what the critical response time is can help planners build in essential design components to limit movement, isolate intruders and facilitate response efforts).

The four major goals of the school security assessment and subsequent compliance measures are to improve:

Deterrence –to prevent unwanted visitors from gaining access to school grounds or buildings, and deterrence to avert the impact of natural threats that could result in potential harm to students, staff and property;

Detection –to quickly locate, identify and contain the movement of an unwanted party who has gained unauthorized entry to the school grounds or building;

Delay –to impede, isolate and forestall the movement of an unwanted party within a school building; to prevent access to classroom areas and common gathering points within a school allowing adequate time for a public safety response; and

Response – to ensure that coordinated, interactive and reliable communication system and procedures are in place to facilitate an immediate and effective response from public safety and medical agencies.

All the testimony confirmed the public policy assumption that schools are vulnerable facilities subject to the threat of violence and that protective school design techniques, better planning and uniform standards can make school grounds and school buildings safer places in which to conduct educational activities.

In approaching its work, the Council acknowledged several themes that would help guide or inform its decision making. These include:

The need to balance uniform school safety infrastructure standards with the needs of local communities to design and build schools that are responsive to local educational needs and objectives;
The need to preserve an educational environment for children;
The need to establish a uniform school security infrastructure assessment procedure;
The need to ensure the school building planning process is inclusive of all local decision makers, public safety, building code and fire and life safety code personnel; and
The need to establish a cooperative and constructive compliance system that facilitates attainment of the new standards.

SELECTION AND DEVELOPMENT OF A UNIFORM SCHOOL SECURITY ASSESSMENT TOOL

While the work of the SSIC is born of the events in Newtown involving a rogue shooter, other potential threats, both natural and manmade, have led the Council to consider an

"all hazards" approach to school design and security standards. As a result, the Council has broadened the preventive design standards to incorporate the most up to date seismic and weather related design requirements, while also considering architectural and design deterrents to terrorists, environmental and chemical accidents or attacks.

The need to take an "all hazards approach" to the assessment of school infrastructure vulnerabilities, and the need to develop compliance requirements in school design plans that minimize identified weaknesses and better prepare schools for a host of potential threats is a major goal of the SSIC. In order to develop a uniform set of standards that are adaptable to the many varied school construction sites and types of school construction in Connecticut, there is a need to develop, or adopt, an "all hazards" threat assessment tool that not only recognizes and differentiates the unique security challenges of each facility, but also provides a comparable security analysis of common school security infrastructure characteristics that are part of all major school construction projects.

A uniform risk assessment of a school facility during the design phase of construction allows school districts to acquire a threshold level of awareness and responsiveness to potential threats and can provide a thorough evaluation of school security. A number of potential threats face every individual school facility, each having its own likelihood of occurrence (probability) and potential for injury and damage (severity). A comprehensive risk assessment includes activities to identify and quantify risk utilizing an "all-hazards" approach to threat assessment for both natural and manmade hazards, and can be used as a screening tool for a preliminary design to determine if the critical systems will enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation (response) in the event of an emergency. The primary objective of the risk assessment is to find the most effective mitigation measure(s) to achieve a desired level of protection.

The process of security analysis or risk assessment involves four related components.

Threat Assessment – what types of Undesirable Events may a structure be prone to experience?

Consequences or Severity – a determination of the severity of harm that could impact a facility in the event of an Undesirable Event.

Vulnerabilities – an assessment of actual or planned infrastructure protective design measures against the preferred level of design security thereby identifying areas of weakness or vulnerability

Compliance – The process by which vulnerabilities are identified and remediated to the appropriate School Safety Infrastructure standards or guidelines.

While it may be necessary to extend the use of the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities' (NCEF) Safe School Facilities Check List (the assessment tool currently in use for the Competitive School Security Grant Program) for a period of time, the preferred assessment tool is the automated version of the "Integrated Rapid Visual Screening" (IRVS)

program being developed by the federal DHS in consultation with the SSIC. The IRVS will be described in detail later in Appendix D of this report, but is basically comprised of three components and a compliance determination phase added by the SSIC. These include:

School Security Level – The School Security Level analysis attempts to quantify the level of risk that exists at a particular school as measured by potential casualties, building damage, restoration costs, etc., for each of the potential high risk threats identified in the Undesirable Event Analysis. This analysis establishes a baseline school security level.

Undesirable Event Analysis – each existing school undergoing major renovation and plans for each new school will be subjected to a threat assessment based on the geographic, demographic and structural features of the school and its location. The product of this phase will be a list of school specific threats.

(The system does allow for the predetermination of the likelihood of any specific undesirable event. As a result, in Connecticut the threat assessment for a school shooting shall be considered moderate to high level in all cases).

Level of Protection Analysis – By comparing actual or planned school infrastructure elements that have been assessed against a recommended level of security for anticipated threats, specific areas of vulnerability are identified and recommendations for improvements are offered. In this area the state can establish minimal rating standards in any number of critical areas.

Compliance Determination Process – Once a local school district has completed the assessment, identified potential vulnerabilities and proposed specific plans to remediate deficiencies and secure compliance, the Office of School Facilities, Plan Review Unit will evaluate the local plan for adequacy and continue to work with local districts to ensure compliance with established standards.

While the IRVS appears to be the preferred method for the assessment of school infrastructure, it may not be fully deployed by DHS until mid 2014. As a result, the Council recommends that the Commissioner of DAS may designate the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities' (NCEF) Safe School Facilities Check List (currently in use in Connecticut), or another comparable program, as the initial assessment tool. A brief description of the NCEF Safe School Facilities Check List is provided in Appendix D. Subsequently the state can transition to the new IRVS program when it is available, with the benefit of a planned training and implementation period. SSIC also recommends that the Commissioner of DAS be given the authority to approve other comparable school security infrastructure assessment programs or tools, if requested to do so, and a determination of comparability is made by the Commissioner.

The assessment tool shall be used in all "new construction" or "renovate as new" projects and all school building infrastructure standards established by the SSIC should be applicable to all aspects of school construction.

If the school building plan is an "alteration" proposal, the school facility infrastructure assessment shall be conducted for the entire school with those areas subject to the planned alteration required to meet the recommended security standards resulting from the assessment.

Council members also support the creation of "waiver authority" vested in the Commissioner of DAS when unique or unanticipated conditions are determined by the Commissioner to make compliance with established standards impractical, unreasonable or excessively expensive. Council members also believe that, due to the sensitivity of the plans, detailed school security infrastructure plans should be shielded from disclosure under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA).

DEVELOPMENT AND APPLICATION OF STANDARDS

There are approximately 151 points of reference identified in the Level of Protection phase of the IRVS school security infrastructure program. The Council views these points of reference in three distinct groupings, which are discussed in detail in Appendix A:

1. Mandatory Compliance Areas - include aspects of critical infrastructure involving compliance with established building codes and cover seismic, flood and storm related standards. Also in this category are all provisions of the State Building Code addressing structural requirements and Life Safety Code issues that are mandatory under any condition.

2. Critical Compliance Standards – Nine primary areas of school infrastructure design, some referenced in P.A. 13-3, are identified by the Council as critical elements in school safety infrastructure design and in achieving the goal of more secure schools. Investments in protective design features in these particular areas are believed to offer the most cost effective use of limited resources with a corresponding and relatively high benefit in terms of improved security. These areas include:

1. **School Site Perimeter** - Access Control, Surveillance, Points of Entry and Accessibility, Signage, Lighting, Fencing, Bollards, Landscape

2. **Parking Areas and Vehicular and Pedestrian Routes** - Access Control, Surveillance, Points of Entry and Accessibility, Signage, Lighting, Speed Calming, Landscape, Drop Off/Pick Up Areas, Sidewalks

3. **Recreational Areas** – Playgrounds, Athletic Areas, Multipurpose Fields

4. **Communication Systems** – Mass Notification, Alarm and Information Systems, Interoperable Real Time Response Systems, Radio Systems, Wireless Systems and Multimedia Systems.

5. **School Building Exterior** – Building Perimeter, Access Control, Main Entrance/ Vestibule, Administrative Offices/Lobby, Doors, Glazing/Films, Signage, Lighting, Surveillance, Locking Systems

6. **School Building Interior** – Access Control, Surveillance, Points of Entry and Accessibility, Classrooms, Large Assembly Areas, Doors, Locking Systems, Signage

7. **Roofs** – Access Control
8. **Critical Assets/Utilities** – Access Control, Surveillance, Screens, Critical Building Components, Signage, Hardening, Redundancy, Location
9. **Other Areas** – Dumpsters, Receptacles, Hazardous Materials Storage, Signage, Locker Rooms, Rest Rooms, Specialty Areas, Courtyards

In addition to these nine Critical Compliance Standards, utilizing the "all hazards" approach to school safety, local school districts should consider having a school serve the function of emergency shelter in extreme weather conditions. Schools are typically designed for large assembly occupancy with mass care functions, such as adequate toilets, food service, etc. Multipurpose areas such as the gym or cafeteria have the capacity to accommodate a large number of people and can provide safe shelter from extreme weather conditions. If a new or renovate as new school facility is being constructed with the intent that the facility be used as an emergency shelter, the design of the designated area that is to serve as an emergency shelter should be in compliance with the ICC/NSSA Standard for the Design and Construction of Storm Shelters. ICC 500 is the national standard for compliant safe room/storm shelter in new K-12 school facilities.

3. Other Areas Subject to School Security Infrastructure Guidelines

At minimum, all school facilities are required to be compliant with state and federal building and fire codes. In other areas of school design and construction, standards and guidelines may be somewhat more variable providing local authorities with the flexibility to create an increased level of safety and security while meeting broader educational objectives. Areas not identified in the Mandatory or Critical Compliance sections noted above will be subject to more flexible guidelines to be incorporated in the School Security Technical Compliance Guidelines that are currently under development. Once complete this document will be incorporated in the SSIC final report as an updated and free standing Appendix E to be used by design and architectural professionals, along with Appendix A, to achieve security design objectives.

PLANS FOR ROLLOUT OF STANDARDS TO SCHOOL AND CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY OFFICIALS

Recognizing the pervasive impact these new standards will have throughout Connecticut's educational and public safety community and construction industry, the SSIC has asked DAS to develop a comprehensive program to inform the key stake holders of the changes that are likely to take place over the next six months. As the Legislature considers implementation of the new standards, the Departments of Education, Administrative Services and Emergency Services and Public Protection will develop a broad based orientation program designed to inform interested groups and the general public.

Appendix A

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to Public Act (PA) 13-3, Section 80 (b), the School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC) has been charged with developing school safety infrastructure standards for school building projects under chapter 173 of the general statutes. Such standards are to conform to industry standards for school building safety infrastructure and are to include, but are not limited to, standards regarding (1) entryways to school buildings and classrooms… (2) the use of cameras throughout the school building and at all entrances and exits, including the use of closed-circuit television monitoring… (3) penetration resistant vestibules, and (4) other security infrastructure improvements and devices as they become industry standards.

Section 80 (c) of PA 13-3 requires that the SSIC develop these standards by January 1, 2014, and annually thereafter submit these standards to the School Building Projects Advisory Council (SBPAC) and Section 83 further requires that the SBPAC incorporate such school safety infrastructure standards into the model blueprints for new school building projects that the SBPAC is charged with developing.



Pursuant to section 84 (b) of PA 13-3, on and after the date that the School Safety Infrastructure Council submits the school safety infrastructure standards, the decision to approve or deny an application and the determination of which expenses are eligible for reimbursement under the program shall be in accordance with the school safety infrastructure standards in effect on the date from which a complete grant application has been submitted to the Office of School Facilities (OSF) in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 173 of the Connecticut General Statutes (CGS). School Safety Infrastructure Standards apply to new and renovate as new projects.

COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO SCHOOL SECURITY

Introducing safety standards as part of school design requires a holistic approach to balance many objectives, such as reducing risk, creating a welcoming learning environment that is secure, facilitating proper building function, hardening of physical structures beyond the required building code, and developing security and safety planning standards to establish protocol for security management during times of crises.

Prior to the submission of a school construction grant application, a uniform risk assessment of the site and all buildings on the site for which a school facility is to be located will be required. The uniform risk assessment will give school districts the ability to determine a threshold level of awareness and responsiveness to potential threats to all hazards on, or in close proximity to, a proposed school construction project site. The “all hazards” approach

should be used as the preferred screening tool for preliminary design because it allows districts the opportunity to assess its critical assets, account for its vulnerabilities to natural or manmade hazards, and to determine the most effective mitigation measure to achieve a desired level of protection. Please refer to Appendix D of the January 2014 School Safety Infrastructure Council Report for the preferred risk assessment tool for Connecticut.

Central to the security assessment process and the development of the School Security Infrastructure Plan is the need to conduct an emergency response time analysis (ERTA) to determine the actual amount of time needed for a police response to a specific school in a crisis situation. This exercise will also help in appropriate design decisions related to architectural safeguards, locking technologies and locations and other measures that could deter or delay an intruder for an amount of time necessary to ensure an onsite public safety response prior to deep building penetration. An ERTA should be conducted for each proposed school design plan to better inform local planners on which school security design features may be appropriate for impeding the entry of unwanted individuals or preventing or delaying the free movement of such parties in a school facility.

Utilizing the "all hazards" approach to school safety, municipalities should work with local school districts to consider whether a school should serve the function of an emergency shelter in severe emergency conditions, such as a major storm or power outage. Schools are typically designed for large assembly occupancy with mass care functions, such as adequate toilets, showers, food service, etc. Multipurpose areas such as the gym or cafeteria have the capacity to accommodate a large number of people and can provide safe shelter from extreme conditions. If a new or renovate-as-new school facility is being constructed with the intent that the facility may serve as an emergency shelter, the design of the designated area that is to serve as an emergency shelter should be in compliance with the ICC/NSSA Standard for the Design and Construction of Storm Shelters. ICC 500 is the national standard for compliant safe room/storm shelter in new K-12 school facilities. In addition, municipalities and school districts should consider equipping schools with auxiliary power capability, either through an installed generator or at least the wiring and outlet to install a generator (i.e., "plug-in ready").

For security infrastructure to be effective, an "all hazards" school security and safety plan must be in place prior to building occupancy to establish procedures for managing various types of emergencies. Each school employee should receive an orientation on the plan to allow school districts and municipal officials the ability to implement a unified approach to emergency planning, preparedness, and response. Pursuant to PA 13-3, Section 86, the Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), in consultation with the State Department of Education, has developed an all hazards School Security and Safety Plan Standards together with an all hazards School Security and Safety Plan Template which is scheduled for release by January 1, 2014.

SCHOOL SAFETY DESIGN COMMITTEE

To design and develop a safe and secure school requires the input of community representatives and local officials during the design phase of construction. The SSIC

recommends that a School Safety Design Committee be established for each school construction project, during the design phase of construction, to review and make recommendations on safety and security features that meet the programmatic needs of their respective school district. Membership of the School Safety Design Committee should include those representatives assigned to the School Security and Safety Committee as defined in the School Security and Safety Plan Standards and may include any other person the board of education deems appropriate, including, but not limited to, the project architect, school transportation manager, school resource officer, school security manager, and local emergency management director.

DEVELOPING SCHOOL SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE STANDARDS

The preferred risk assessment tool for Connecticut identifies more than one hundred fifty (150) criteria that may require mitigation to achieve the desired level of protection for any given school facility. The SSIC views these points of reference in three distinct groupings - mandatory compliance areas, critical compliance areas, and guideline recommendations. By categorizing compliance areas into three distinct groups, the SSIC provides districts flexibility in how to achieve the desired level of protection for their school facility, while still ensuring an increased level of uniformity as the state works to provide safe and secure school environments.

1. **Mandatory Compliance Areas** include areas of critical infrastructure that require compliance with the most current building and fire codes as adopted and amended by the State of Connecticut. As these standards already address issues related to natural hazards, such as seismic, flood and storm requirements, these issues are not further addressed within the critical compliance areas of the school safety infrastructure standards. These mandatory compliance areas represent the minimal level of compliance for building projects of any kind under any circumstance in the state.

2. **Critical Compliance Areas** are primary areas of school safety infrastructure design, some of which were specifically identified by PA 13-3, that have been identified as critical design elements for school safety infrastructure to achieve the goal of more secure schools. Critical compliance may reinforce building and fire code and will enhance safety and security features related to school infrastructure. This level of compliance represents the areas that a district must address to be eligible for a school construction grant. School safety infrastructure standards have been developed to protect areas considered to be the most vulnerable for breach of security and include:

    1) School Site Perimeter;
    2) Parking Areas and Vehicular and Pedestrian Routes;
    3) Recreational Areas (playgrounds, athletic areas, multipurpose fields);
    4) Communication Systems;
    5) School Building Exterior;

6) School Building Interior;
7) Roofs;
8) Critical Assets/Utilities; and
9) Other Areas.

Investments in protective design features in these particular areas offer the most cost effective use of limited resources with a corresponding and relatively high benefit in terms of improved security. As such, compliance in these areas is required for grant approval. In many instances, districts may reach compliance in one of several ways, depending on the nature of the site, the project, and the district demographics.

Protective design features should include design functions that allow for natural and mechanical surveillance. Natural surveillance is the use of design, including spatial definition and designation strategies, to increase the actual abilities of guardians to observe intruders, as well as to increase the perception of intruders that they may be observed by others. Mechanical surveillance is the use of mechanical or electronic devices for observation purposes, such as mirrors, closed circuit television (CCTV), or sound recording devices. Visual observation is greatly facilitated by appropriate lighting, which can help reduce crime opportunity by increasing the perceived risks relative to the chances of being observed and can also help reduce the fear of crime.

The development of these school safety infrastructure standards is based on literature review, data analysis, expert testimony gathered from public informational meetings held by the SSIC between the months of June and September 2013, identification of best practices both within and outside the State of Connecticut, and in coordination with the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology Directorate, Resilient Systems Division in the development of the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) assessment tool for the design of safe schools. For more information on the specific reference material to this report, please see Addendum 1 – School Safety Infrastructure Reference Material.

3. Other Areas not identified in the Mandatory or Critical Compliance sections noted above will be subject to the School Safety Technical Compliance Guidelines that are currently under development. Once complete this document will be incorporated in the SSIC final report as an updated and free standing Appendix E to be used by design and architectural professionals, along with Appendix A, to achieve security design objectives.

I. School Safety Infrastructure Standards

1. School Site Perimeter

The fundamental objective of site planning is to place school buildings, parking areas, and other necessary structures in such a way as to provide a setting that is functionally effective, as well as aesthetically pleasing. Increasing concerns for security add another dimension to the range of issues that must be considered.

1.1. Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) is a crime prevention strategy that uses architectural design, landscape planning, security systems, and visual surveillance to create a potentially crime free environment by influencing human behavior and should be applied when appropriate. CPTED usually involves the following principles:

1.1.1. Natural Surveillance – using physical features to preclude blind spots or hiding spots to enhance visibility and keep intruders easily observable.

1.1.2. Territorial Reinforcement – using physical barriers to express ownership over an area and to distinguish public and private areas.

1.1.3. Natural Access Control – strategic placement of points of entry/egress, fencing, landscaping and lighting to create a perception of risk to potential intruders.

1.1.4. Target Hardening – use of features that prohibit entry or accessibility.

1.2. All protective design features should include functions that allow for natural and mechanical surveillance.

1.3. Fencing, landscaping, edge treatment, bollards, signage, exterior furnishings and exterior lighting may be used to establish territorial boundaries and clearly delineate areas of public, semi-public, semi-private, and private space.

ACCESS CONTROL

The following minimum standards shall be met:

1.4. School boundaries and property lines shall be clearly demarcated to control access to a school facility and shall clearly delineate areas of public, semi-public, semi-private, and private space.

1.5. Where a school is a shared use facility that serves the community, internal boundaries shall be clearly defined to establish a distinct perimeter for both the school and the

shared use facilities with separate and secure access points that are clearly defined. Boundaries may be defined by installing fencing, signage, edge treatment, landscaping, and ground surface treatment.

1.6. Bollards shall be kept clear of ADA access ramps and the corner quadrants of streets. (A bollard is a post or set of posts used to delimit an area or to exclude vehicles).

1.7. The number of vehicle and pedestrian access points to school property shall be kept to a minimum and shall be clearly designated as such.

1.8. Directional signage shall be installed at primary points of entry to control pedestrian and vehicular access and to clearly delineate vehicular and pedestrian traffic routes. Signage should be simple and clear. Signage should have reflective or lighted markings.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

1.9. Fencing, if installed, around the perimeter of the school property shall not permit footholds, where feasible, to deter unauthorized access to a school facility.

1.10. Fencing, if installed, shall be free of any vegetation. Remove bushes, trees, containers, or any other object that might provide a hiding place from the proximity of the fence.

1.11. Bollards, if installed, should not be less than thirty (30) inches in height and shall never exceed a height of forty two (42) inches. Spacing for bollards, if installed, shall be between thirty six (36) and forty eight (48) inches apart.

1.12. Rectangular planters, if installed, shall not be more than two (2) feet wide and six (6) feet long, and circular planters shall be no more than three (3) feet in diameter.

1.13. Maintain a maximum distance of four (4) feet between planters and other permanent streetscape elements.

1.14. Do not use planters in high pedestrian traffic areas to allow for the free flow of pedestrian traffic during high use times.

1.15. Orient planters in a direction parallel to the curb or primary flow of pedestrian traffic. In no case should a planter or line of planters be placed perpendicular to the curb.

1.16. Landscaping within planters shall be kept below thirty (30) inches in height, except when use requirements call for increased foliage. Depending on the threat, consideration should be given to ensuring that a six (6) inch high package could not be concealed in the foliage.

1.17. Secure manholes, utility tunnels, culverts, and similar unintended access points to the school property with locks, gates, or other appropriate devices without creating additional entrapment hazards.

SURVEILLANCE

The following minimum standards shall be met:

1.18. Unsupervised site entrances shall be secured during low use times for access control purposes.

1.19. Perimeter fencing, landscaping and signage shall not obstruct the view of natural and/or mechanical surveillance.

1.20. Landscaping shall be properly maintained to provide an unobstructed view for natural and/or mechanical surveillance. Shrubs and hedges bordering walkways shall not exceed eighteen (18) inches in height and tree branches and leaves shall be kept clear to a minimum of eight (8) feet off the ground.

1.21. The design shall allow for the monitoring of points of entry/egress by natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation and during special events.

1.22. At minimum, mechanical surveillance shall be used at the primary access points to the site for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

1.23. Site Lighting shall be installed at all points of entry/egress.

1.24. Designated pedestrian and vehicular traffic routes shall be adequately lit to reinforce natural and or mechanical surveillance during evening hours.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

1.25. Avoid blocking lines of sight with fencing, signage, and landscaping.

1.26. Avoid dense vegetation in close proximity to a school building, where it could screen illicit activity.

1.27. Locate access points in areas of high visibility that can be easily observed and monitored by staff and students in the course of their normal activities. Natural surveillance may be maximized by controlling access points that clearly demarcate boundaries and spaces.

1.28. Closed Circuit Television (CCTV) may be used around the site perimeter to provide views of points of entry/egress and as a means to securely monitor an area when natural surveillance is not available.

1.29. Surveillance equipment, where installed, shall be mounted to resist forces in any direction. Surveillance equipment should be designed to protect against tampering, vandalism, and natural hazards.

1.30. Security lighting, if installed, shall be directed at the building.

1.31. If a CCTV system is installed, site lighting shall be coordinated with the CCTV system.

2. Parking Areas and Vehicular and Pedestrian Routes

The following minimum standards shall be met:

2.1. External access to parking areas shall be kept to a limited number of controlled entrances. A minimum of two vehicular points of entry/egress shall be provided to separate passenger and delivery vehicles.

2.2. Points of entry/egress shall allow for natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation and during special events.

2.3. At the minimum, mechanical surveillance shall be used at the primary access points to the site for both pedestrian and vehicular traffic.

2.4. Designated pedestrian and vehicular points of entry/egress and traffic routes shall be adequately lit to reinforce natural and or mechanical surveillance during evening hours.

2.5. Signage shall be posted at all vehicular access points with rules as to who is allowed to use parking facilities and when they are allowed to do so. Signage should be simple and have the necessary level of clarity. Signage should have reflective or lighted markings.

2.6. Where distance from the building to the nearest curb provides insufficient setback, parking shall be restricted in the curb lane.

2.7. Unmanned points of entry that are otherwise secured shall be made accessible for emergency vehicles.

2.8. Parking areas shall be adequately lit with vandal resistant lighting.

2.9. Parking shall be prohibited under or within the school building.

2.10. Security lighting shall be provided at site entry locations, roadways, parking lots, and walkways from parking to buildings.

2.11. Pedestrian routes from drop off areas shall be sufficient to accommodate peak periods of use.

2.12. Vehicle circulation routes to service and delivery areas, visitors' entry, bus drop-off, student parking and staff parking shall be separated, clearly demarcated, and easily supervised. Fire lanes around the building shall be closed off from maintenance and other traffic with "break-away" bollards.

2.13. A drop-off/pick-up lane shall be designated for buses only with a dedicated loading and unloading zone designed adequately to allow for natural and/or mechanical surveillance and to avoid overcrowding and accidents.

2.14. Shipping and receiving areas shall be separated from all utility rooms by at least fifty (50) feet. The fifty (50) foot boundary shall be measured from the outer most perimeter of the shipping and receiving area to the outer most perimeter of the utility room. Utility mains and service areas include electrical, telephone, data, fire alarm, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains.

2.15. Landscaping shall be designed to provide an unobstructed view for natural and/or mechanical surveillance. Shrubs and hedges bordering walkways shall not exceed eighteen (18) inches in height and tree branches and leaves shall be kept clear to a minimum of eight (8) feet off the ground.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

2.16. Design entry roads so that vehicles do not have a straight-line approach to the main building. Use speed-calming features to keep vehicles from gaining enough speed to penetrate barriers. Speed-calming features may include, but are not limited to speed bumps, safety islands, differing pavement surfaces, landscape buffers, lights, or exterior furnishings and lighting.

2.17. Secure unsupervised site entrances during low use times for access control.

2.18. Sign text should prevent confusion over site circulation, parking, and entrance location. Unless otherwise required, signs should not identify sensitive or high risk areas. However, signs should be erected to indicate areas of restricted admittance.

2.19. Parking areas should be designed in locations that promote natural surveillance

to mitigate illicit behavior. Parking should be located within view of the occupied building, while maintaining the maximum stand-off distance possible.

2.20. Locate visitor parking in areas that provide the fewest security risks to school personnel. The distance at which a potentially threatening vehicle can park in relation to school grounds and buildings should be controlled.

2.21. Keep the number of driveways or parking lots that students will have to cross to get into the school building to a minimum.

2.22. Consider security lighting in areas where recreational activities and other nontraditional uses of the building occur. If CCTV is provided, adequate lighting shall be designed to accommodate it.

2.23. Consider blue light emergency phones in all parking areas. If utilized, blue light emergency phones shall be clearly visible and readily accessible in well-lit areas with mechanical surveillance.

2.24. Consider panic buttons or intercom call boxes in parking areas as needed to enhance security.

3. Recreational Areas – Playgrounds, Athletic Areas, Multipurpose Fields.

The following minimum standards shall be met:

3.1. The design shall allow for ground-level, unobstructed views, for natural and/or mechanical surveillance of all outdoor athletic areas, playgrounds and recreation areas at all times.

3.2. Playgrounds and other student gathering areas shall be located away from public vehicle access areas, such as streets or parking lots by a minimum of fifty (50) feet. The fifty (50) foot boundary shall be measured from the outer most perimeter of the playground or other public gathering area and the outer most perimeter of the public vehicle access area or parking lot.

3.3. Playground equipment shall be secure and safe.

3.4. Pre-kindergarten and kindergarten play areas shall be separated from play areas designed for other students.

3.5. Athletic areas and multipurpose fields shall contain a physical protective barrier to control access and protect the area.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

3.6. Locate access points to recreational areas in areas of high visibility that can be easily observed and monitored by staff and students in the course of their normal activities. Natural surveillance may be maximized by controlling access points that clearly demarcate boundaries and spaces.

3.7. Installing fences internal to the site perimeter around pre-kindergarten and kindergarten play areas may maximize security. If fencing is installed around a pre-kindergarten and kindergarten play area, it shall be a minimum of four (4) feet in height and have a minimum clearance of six (6) feet horizontally in all directions from the play equipment. Emergency/Pedestrian access gates with approved egress hardware shall be installed in fencing enclosing pre-k and kindergarten areas.

4. Communication Systems

The following minimum standards shall be met:

4.1. All classrooms shall have two way communications with the administrative office.

4.2. All communication systems shall be installed in compliance with State Building and Fire Code requirements.

4.3. All critical lines or lines that distribute information to first responders, supporting agencies, public safety officials and others shall allow for effective response and incident management and have at least one layer of redundancy, or backup, with maximum physical separation between the primary line and backup line. These systems may include radio, electronic, wireless or multimedia technology which provide real time information (such as audio, visual, mapping and relevant data) directly to first responders.

4.4. A means of mass notification shall be installed and maintained to notify all occupants and people in the immediate vicinity in case of emergency. Mass notification systems may include but are not limited to public address (PA) systems, intercoms, loudspeakers, sirens, strobes, SMS text alert systems, and other emerging interoperable resource sharing communication platforms.

4.5. All new buildings shall have approved radio coverage for first responders within the building based upon the existing coverage levels of communication systems at the exterior of the building. The system as installed must comply with all applicable sections of Federal Communication Commission (FCC) Rules for Communication Systems and shall coordinate with the downlink and uplink pass band frequencies of the respective first responders.

4.6. All in-building radio systems shall be compatible with both analog and digital communications simultaneously at the time of installation.

4.7. Critical areas such as emergency command center, fire pump room, exit stairs, exit passageways, elevator lobbies, standpipe cabinets, sprinkler sectional valve locations and similar critical areas shall provide radio coverage in compliance with all applicable sections of the FCC Rules for Communications Systems. General building areas shall also be provided with radio coverage in compliance with the applicable sections of the FCC Rules for Communications Systems.

4.8. Alarm and information systems shall not be concentrated, nor mounted in a single conduit. Circuits should be installed in at least two directions and/or risers.

4.9. Areas of refuge shall be provided with a two-way communication system between the area of refuge and a central control point. If the central control point is not constantly attended, the area of refuge shall also have controlled access to a public telephone system. The two-way communication system shall include both audible and visible signals.

4.10. In areas of refuge that have a two-way emergency communications system, instructions shall be provided on the use of the area under emergency conditions and be posted adjacent to the communications system. The instructions shall include all of the following:

4.10.1. Directions to find other means of egress. Information on planned availability of assistance in the use of stairs or supervised operation of elevators and how to summon such assistance.

4.10.2. Directions for use of the emergency communications system.

4.11. Where exit sign illumination is required, the area of refuge sign shall be illuminated. Additionally, tactile signage complying with ICC A117.1 shall be located at each door to an area of refuge.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

4.12. Consider operational procedures in coordination with security standards that include emergency notifications for immediate threat and the testing of emergency response procedures.

4.13. Consider a communication strategy in coordination with security standards that include the distribution of a radio or wireless communication system to appropriate personnel, with necessary antennas, for utilization in case of emergency.

4.14. If radio communication systems are used, radios shall be capable of operating on frequencies reserved by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) for school districts.

4.15. Radio system and signal booster supervisory signals should include antenna malfunction and signal booster failure. Power supply supervisory signals should include loss of normal AC power, failure of battery charger, and low battery capacity (alarming at 70 percent of battery capacity).

4.16. If radio communication systems are used, the in-building radio system shall be capable of operating on a battery dedicated to the system with at least twenty four (24) hours of 100 percent system operation capacity.

4.17. Call buttons should be installed at key public contact areas.

5. School Building Exterior – Points of Entry/Egress and Accessibility

SCHOOL BUILDING EXTERIOR

The following minimum standards shall be met:

5.1. Points of entry/egress shall be designed to allow for monitoring by natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation and during special events.

5.2. At minimum, mechanical surveillance shall be used at the primary points of entry.

5.3. Signage shall be placed at all public points of entry/egress to the school. Signage should be simple and be clear. Signage shall be reflective with contrasting background.

5.4. Lighting shall be sufficient to illuminate potential areas of concealment, enhance natural and/or mechanical surveillance, and discourage vandalism.

5.5. Emergency lighting shall be available for safe evacuation, assault prevention, and to reduce the risk of panic related injuries.

5.6. Trees shall be a minimum of ten (10) feet from the building to prevent window or roof access to the school facility.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

5.7. Avoid dense vegetation and street furniture in close proximity to a school building, where it could screen illicit activity.

5.8. Consider a panic button or intercom call boxes along the building perimeter as needed to enhance security.

MAIN ENTRANCE/ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES/LOBBY

The following minimum standards shall be met:

5.9. Main entrances shall be well lit and unobstructed to allow for natural and/or mechanical surveillance at all times.

5.10. The design shall allow for visitors to be guided to a single control point for entry.

5.11. The main entrance shall be bullet resistant and blast resistant. Glazing at and around exterior doors should be kept to a minimum.

5.12. Main entrance doors shall be controllable from a remote location, such as the office of school security or through the central administrative office.

5.13 The main entrance shall have a communication system in place which allows the front desk to communicate with visitors and, in case of an emergency, to the rest of the school.

5.14 Cameras shall be installed in such a manner that shows who enters and leaves the building.

5.15. The design shall allow for providing visitor accessibility only after proper identification.

5.16. Door hardware, handles, locks and thresholds shall be grade one.

5.17. Main entrance door hinge pins shall be located on the unsecured side of perimeter and critical interior doors must be designed to preclude door removal.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

5.18. The main entrance should have an unobstructed view of lobby doors and perpendicular hallways. If feasible, administrative offices abutting the main entrance should be on an exterior wall with windows for natural surveillance of visitor parking, drop off areas, and exterior routes leading to the main entrance.

5.19. Reinforced walls should be provided in foyers and public entries. Interior and exterior doors should be offset from each other in airlock.

5.20. Use vestibules to increase security. The entrance vestibule shall have both interior and exterior doors that are lockable and controllable from a remote location.

5.21. Post warning signs about trespassing and illicit behavior, citing applicable laws and regulations at primary and secondary points of entry.

5.22. When possible, the design should force visitors to pass directly through a screening area prior to entering or leaving the school. The screening area should be an entrance vestibule, the administration/reception area, a lobby check in station, an entry kiosk, or some other controlled area. This controlled entrance should serve as the primary control point between the main entrance and all other areas of the school.

5.23. Control visitor access through mechanical surveillance with intercom audio and buzz-in entry.

5.24. Restrict visitor access during normal hours of operation to the primary entrance. If school buildings require multiple entry points, regulate those entry points with no access to people without proper authorization. Consider an electronic access control system for authorized persons if multiple entry points are utilized during normal hours of operation.

5.25. Administrative offices should be directly adjacent to the main entrance.

5.26. Other educational office space that may service the community at large should be in close proximity to the main entrance.

5.27. Install a panic/duress alarm or call button at the receptionist's desk as a protective measure.

5.28. Proximity cards, keys, key fob, coded entries, or other devices may be used for access control of students and staff during normal hours of operation. The system may be local (residing in the door hardware) or global (building or district-wide). Prior to installing a customized door access control system check with your local building and fire official to ensure compliance with state building and fire code.

5.29. Magnetic locks, if installed, shall have a minimum of 1,200 pounds of holding power.

5.30. Electric strikes, if installed, shall meet the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) standard for Burglary Resistant Electric Locking Mechanisms.

5.31. Consider sensors that alert administrative offices when exterior doors at all primary and secondary points of entry are left open.

5.32. Consider radio frequency access control devices at primary points of entry to allow rapid entry by emergency responders.

EXTERIOR DOORS

The following minimum standards shall be met:

5.33. The design shall allow for the points of entry/egress to be monitored by natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation and during special events.

5.34. Signage shall be placed at all public points of entry/egress to the school. Signage should be simple and be clear. Signage should be reflective with a contrasting background.

5.35. Lighting shall be sufficient to illuminate potential areas of concealment, enhance natural and/or mechanical surveillance, discourage vandalism and protect against vandalism.

5.36. All doors that serve as a means of egress shall meet life safety and fire code for emergency evacuation.

5.37. All exit doors shall be equipped with emergency exit hardware and not locked or secured by any other means and under no circumstances be chained shut.

5.38. Means of egress doors shall have handles and push bars that are flush with the door.

5.39. All exterior doors shall be hardened to be penetration resistant and burglar resistant.

5.40. All exterior doors shall be constructed of steel, aluminum alloy, or solid core hardwood and designed and certified to resist against natural hazards.

5.41. All exterior doors shall open outward.

5.42. All exterior doors shall be equipped with hardware capable of implementing a full perimeter lockdown.

5.43. All exterior doors shall be easy to lock and allow for quick release in the event of an emergency.

5.44. All exterior doors with interior locks shall have the capability of being unlocked/released from the interior with one motion.

5.45. Door locking systems shall allow for exit without impediment.

5.46. Door hardware, handles, locks and thresholds shall be grade one.

5.47. Exterior door hinge pins shall be located on the unsecured side of perimeter and critical interior doors must be designed to preclude door removal.

5.48 All exterior doors that allow access to the interior of the school shall be numbered in sequential order in a clockwise manner starting with the main entrance. All numbers shall be visible from the street or closest point of entry/egress, contrast with its background and be retro-reflective. Interior access to rooms with exterior doors shall be identified with the same number.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

5.49. Permit entry and egress during normal hours of operation through a limited number of doors.

5.50. Secure double doors with heavy duty, multiple point, and long flush bolts.

5.51. Doors should have an adjustable spring or air return to ensure they are always closed and should be inspected on a regular basis to ensure they are functioning properly.

5.52. Doors vulnerable to unauthorized use by students should be made more secure by installing door alarms or sensors to alert school security or administrative offices when the door is not properly closed and/or latched.

5.53. Doors vulnerable to unauthorized access may be secured through the use of other protective measures, such as delayed opening devices, or cameras monitored by administrative offices or security personnel.

5.54. Install face plates at exterior door latches to prevent levering.

5.55. Proximity cards, keys, key fob, coded entries, or other devices may be used for access control of students and staff during normal hours of operation. The system may be local (residing in the door hardware) or global (building or district-wide). Prior to installing a customized door access control system check with your local building and fire official to ensure compliance with state building and fire code.

5.56. Magnetic locks, if installed, shall have a minimum of 1,200 pounds of holding power.

5.57. Electric strikes, if installed, shall meet the Underwriters Laboratory (UL) standard for Burglary Resistant Electric Locking Mechanisms.

5.58. Doors that do not allow access to the building should not be numbered, so that first responders can readily identify access doors.

5.59. Keep glazing at and around exterior doors to a minimum.

EXTERIOR WINDOWS/GLAZING/FILMS

Windows should be as resistant as possible to mitigate natural and manmade hazards, while at the same time meeting standards for high performance, allowing for natural surveillance, and providing students and personnel the ability to communicate with outside responders in the event of an emergency. Windows may also serve as a secondary means of egress in case of emergency.

The following minimum standards shall be met:

5.60. Horizontal windows shall be set at a minimum of forty four (44) inches above the finished floor to limit entry. If the window is set above forty four (44) inches of the finished floor entry, it cannot serve as a "rescue window" or secondary means of egress per fire code regulations.

5.61. Any window latching device shall be capable of being operated from not more than forty eight (48) inches above the finished floor.

5.62. Each classroom having exterior windows shall have the classroom number affixed to the upper right hand corner of the first and last window of the corresponding classroom. The numbers shall be reflective, with contrasting background. Signage specifications and installation shall be in compliance with ADA standards and other applicable regulations as required.

5.63. Glazing shall be minimized in high risk areas, such as lobbies and loading docks.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

5.64. Locate windows away from public streets and roadways.

5.65. Design windows, framing and anchoring systems to be shatter resistant, bullet resistant, burglar resistant, and forced entry resistant, especially in areas of high risk, such as the main entrance, and in areas of refuge.

5.66. Resistance for glazing may be built into the window or applied with a film.

5.67. Classroom windows should be operable to allow for evacuation in an emergency.

6. School Building Interior

Interior physical security measures are a valuable part of a school's overall physical security infrastructure. Some physical measures such as doors, locks, and windows deter, prevent or delay an intruder from freely moving throughout a school and from entering areas where students and personnel may be located. Natural and mechanical surveillance can assist in locating and identifying a threat and minimizing the time it takes for first responders to neutralize a threat.

The following minimum standards shall be met:

6.1. The design shall provide for controlled access to classrooms and other areas in the interior during normal hours of operation to protect against intruders.

6.2. Emergency lighting shall be available for safe evacuation, assault prevention, and to reduce the risk of panic related injuries. All emergency lighting shall have adequate backup.

6.3. Placement of interior signage shall be such that no point in an exit access corridor is in excess of the rated viewing distance from the nearest sign.

6.4. An interior room numbering system shall be established using a three-digit number and include applicable prefixes and suffixes. The numbering system shall start at 000 for the basement; 100 for the first floor; 200 for the second floor; and so on. Room numbers shall be coordinated such that even numbers are on one side of a corridor and odd numbers are on the other side. Numbering shall be in sequential order in a clockwise manner starting with the interior door closest to the main point of entry. Interior room number signage may be wall mounted. Additional room number signage may be ceiling or flag mounted. Interior room number signage specifications and installation shall be in compliance with ADA standards and other applicable regulations as required.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

6.5. Establish separate entrance and exit patterns for areas that have concentrated high-volume use, such as cafeterias and corridors, to reduce time required for movement into and out of spaces and to reduce the opportunity for personal conflict. Separation of student traffic flow can help define orderly movement and save time, and an unauthorized user will perceive a greater risk of detection.

6.6. Consider intruder doors that automatically lock when an intruder alarm or lockdown is activated to limit intruder accessibility within the building. If installed, intruder doors shall automatically release in the event of an emergency or power outage and

must be equipped with a means for law enforcement and other first responders to open as necessary.

INTERIOR SURVEILLANCE

The following minimum standards shall be met:

6.7. An electronic security system shall be installed in all school facilities.

6.8. If interior mechanical surveillance is utilized, the surveillance mechanism shall be monitored from a central location, such as the office of school security or through the administrative offices.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

6.9. Consider mechanical surveillance in lobbies, corridors, hallways, large assembly areas, stairwells or other areas as a means to securely monitor those areas when natural surveillance is not available. Prior to installing mechanical surveillance systems in these areas check with your local building and fire official to ensure compliance with state building and fire codes.

6.10. The design should allow for the designation of controlled hiding spaces in classrooms, hallways, gyms, cafeterias and in other critical areas. The controlled hiding place should create a safe place for students and personnel to hide and protect themselves in the event of an emergency. Training and simulation exercises should be frequently conducted to instill a quick reaction for students and personnel to reach the area of refuge in the event of an emergency.

CLASSROOM SECURITY

The following minimum standards shall be met:

6.11. All classrooms shall be equipped with a communications system to alert administration in case of emergency. Such communication systems may consist of a push-to-talk button, an identifiable telephone system, or other means.

6.12. Classroom doors shall be constructed of steel, aluminum alloy, or solid core hardwood.

6.13. Classroom doors shall provide a minimum of thirty two (32) inches of clear opening and swing open to a minimum of ninety (90) degrees.

6.14. Means of egress doors with two door leaves without a mullion shall provide one leaf shelf opening width of thirty two (32) inches. The maximum width of a swinging door leaf shall be forty eight (48) inches nominal.

6.15. Door hardware, handles, locks and thresholds shall be grade one.

6.16. Classroom doors and locks shall be tamper resistant.

6.17. All classroom doors shall be lockable.

6.18. Door hardware shall allow staff to quickly lock rooms from the inside without stepping into the hallway.

6.19. Classroom door locks shall be easy to lock and allow for quick release in the event of an emergency.

6.20. Classroom doors with interior locks shall have the capability of being unlocked/released from the interior with one motion.

6.21.All door locking systems must comply with life safety and fire codes to allow for emergency evacuation.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

6.22. Doorways should not be recessed.

6.23. Doors in main corridors should swing a full 180 degrees.

6.24. If classroom doors are equipped with a side window, the window should be installed on the hinge side of the door, away from the door locking system.

6.25. If interior windows are installed to provide lines of site into/out of classrooms or other populated areas, certain factors should be taken into consideration relating to the size, placement and material used for those windows, including:

6.25.1. Minimizing the size of windows or the installation of multiple interspersed smaller windows with barriers in a larger window area to deter intruder accessibility.

6.25.2. Placing windows at a sufficient distance from the interior locking mechanism to prevent or make difficult the opening of a door or lock from outside.

6.25.3. Concealing or obstructing window views to prevent an assailant's ability to ascertain the status or presence of persons inside of a classroom during lockdown

6.25.4. Hardening window frames to lessen window vulnerability.

LARGE ASSEMBLY AREAS **(gym, auditorium, cafeteria, lecture hall or other areas of large assembly)**

The following minimum standards shall be met:

6.26. Large assembly areas shall have separate, secure and controllable entrances. The design should prevent unauthorized access to the rest of the school.

6.27. Points of entrance and egress shall be clearly demarcated.

6.28. The design shall allow for the monitoring of points of entry/egress by natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation and during special events.

6.29. Signage shall be placed at all public points of entry/egress to the assembly area. Signage should be simple, and be clear. Signage should be reflective with a contrasting background.

6.30. Seating and circulation layouts shall be adequate to allow for emergency exit.

6.31. Lighting shall be sufficient to illuminate potential areas of concealment, enhance natural and/or mechanical surveillance, discourage vandalism and protect against vandalism.

6.32. Emergency lighting shall be available for safe evacuation, assault prevention, and to reduce the risk of panic related injuries. All emergency lighting shall have adequate backup.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

6.33. The main entrance to a large assembly area should be unobstructed to allow for natural surveillance.

6.34. Mechanical surveillance should be used in large assembly areas and at all exit doors to securely monitor those areas when natural surveillance is not available.

6.35. Clear lines of site should be established for easy traffic flow.

6.36. A secure and lockable storage area should be provided for storage and equipment.

Shared Space or Mixed Occupancy (Library, BOE, Mixed Use or Other Community Service)

In certain circumstances a municipality or school district may choose to share space on a school site to support other educational or community service activities, such as board of education office space, municipal government office space, health and family service or some other use that supports the educational theme of the school, or some other use that provides a needed service to the community. All buildings located within the property line of a school facility must be included as part of the uniform risk assessment which is to be completed prior to the submission of a school construction grant application. A shared use may require enhanced levels of security that are not reimbursable under the school construction grant program.

The following minimum standards shall be met:

6.37. Shared space shall have separate, secure and controllable entrances.

6.38. The design of shared should prevent unauthorized access to the rest of the school.

6.39. The design of shared space shall allow for the monitoring of points of entry/egress by natural and/or mechanical surveillance during normal hours of operation.

6.40. Signage should be simple and clearly define the intended use and occupancy of the space. Signage shall clearly demarcate all public points of entry and egress.

6.41. Locate parking for shared space in areas that provide the fewest security risks to school personnel and students. The distance at which a potentially threatening vehicle can park in relation to school grounds and buildings should be controlled.

7. Roofs

The following minimum standards shall be met:

7.1. The design shall allow for roof accessibility to authorized personnel only.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

7.2. Access to the roof should be internal to the building. Roof access hatches shall be locked from the inside.

7.3. If external access exists, roof ladders should be removable, retractable, or lockable. Screen walls around equipment or service yards should not provide easy access to the roof or upper windows.

8. Critical Assets/Utilities

The following minimum standards shall be met:

8.1. Screens at utilities, such as transformers or trash dumpsters, shall be designed to minimize concealment opportunities for people and weapons.

8.2. Access to building operations systems shall be restricted to designated users.

8.3. Shipping and receiving areas shall be separated from all utility rooms by at least fifty (50) feet. Utility mains and service areas include electrical, telephone, data, fire alarm, fire suppression water mains, cooling and heating mains (guidelines).

8.4. Loading docks shall be designed to keep vehicles from driving into or parking under the facility.

8.5. Critical equipment shall be properly anchored, elevated, and protected.

8.6. Life safety equipment shall automatically be connected to a backup power supply to provide service if the main power supply is disrupted in case of emergency.

8.7. Emergency generation systems shall be sized to carry the entire load connected to the emergency system at one time.

8.8. Schools without an uninterruptable power supply (UPS) shall have a sufficient backup source to maintain voice communications for up to twenty four (24) hours.

8.9. Emergency backup electric power shall be provided for all systems that must be operational at all systems.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

8.10. Critical building components should be located away from vulnerable areas. Critical building components may include, but are not limited to:

- Emergency generator;
- Normal fuel storage;
- Main switchgear;
- Telephone distribution;
- Fire pumps;
- Building control centers;
- Uninterruptable Power Supply (UPS) systems controlling critical functions.
- Main refrigeration and ventilation systems if critical to building operation.

- Elevator machinery and controls.
- Shafts for stairs, elevators, and utilities.
- Critical distribution feeders for emergency power.

8.11. Critical building components should be a minimum of fifty (50) feet away from loading docks, front entrances, and parking areas.

8.12. Emergency and normal electrical equipment should not be placed in the same electrical vault.

8.13. Rooms for primary and backup systems should be hardened to improve their resilience.

8.14. Enclose exterior equipment in an area that is lockable and protected with bollards when located adjacent to vehicular routes.

8.15. Secure standpipes, water supply control valves, and other system components.

8.16. Loading zones should be separate from public parking.

8.17. Conceal and/or harden incoming utility systems.

8.18. Provide intrusion detection sensors for all utility services to the building.

8.19. Provide redundant utility systems to support security, life safety and rescue functions.

8.20. Incorporate rapid response and isolation features into HVAC systems.

8.21. Installation of empty conduits for future security control equipment should be considered during construction or major renovation.

8.22. Secure all HVAC intakes and mechanical rooms.

9. Other Security Infrastructure and Design Strategies

The following minimum standards shall be met:

9.1. Trash receptacles, dumpsters, mailboxes and other large containers shall be kept at least thirty (30) feet from the building.

9.2. The design shall include special rooms for hazardous supplies that can be locked.

The following shall be considered during the design phase of a school construction project to provide optimal safety and security:

9.3. Stairwells should be located remotely and should not discharge into lobbies, parking or loading areas.

9.4. Enclose dumpsters in a designated service area or surrounded on three sides by a high wall, and a securable gate. Dumpsters should not provide access to the roof.

OTHER AREAS OF CONSIDERATION

Not all areas within and around a school facility have been specifically identified as part of the School Safety Infrastructure Standards, but nonetheless are important to ensuring a secure facility and should be carefully scrutinized for purposes of safety and security during the design phase of construction. Other areas may include, but are not limited to:

- Courtyards;
- Specialty Areas (art, music, science, computer);
- Rest Rooms;
- Locker Rooms;
- Corridors/Hallways.

At minimum, all school facilities are required to be compliant with state and federal building and fire codes. In other areas of school design and construction, standards and guidelines may be somewhat more variable providing local authorities with the flexibility to create an increased level of safety and security while meeting broader educational objectives. School Security Technical Compliance Guidelines are currently being developed to provide design and architectural professionals with options on how to achieve a district's security objectives. The School Security Technical Compliance Guidelines will be a free standing appendix to the School Safety Infrastructure Report (see Appendix E, School Security Technical Compliance Guidelines).

Addendum 1 – School Safety Infrastructure Reference Material

Several design philosophies and techniques have been incorporated into this primer, including

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Appendix B

SCHOOL SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE COUNCIL – MEMBERSHIP & STAFF

As instructed by Public Act 13-3, the School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC) is comprised of nine members: the Commissioners of the Departments of Administrative Services, Education and Emergency Services and Public Protection or their designees and six members with varying expertise in school security related fields, appointed by legislative leaders.

Members

CHAIR

Commissioner Donald J. DeFronzo
Connecticut State Department of Administrative Services (DAS), Hartford, CT
Representing a commissioner or designee

Bio: Mr. DeFronzo is the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services, and is the Chair of the School Safety Infrastructure Council. He has spent his entire career in public service, including serving as state senator from the sixth district and as mayor of New Britain. While in the legislature, he was chair of the Transportation Committee and the Government Administration & Elections Committee, and sat on the Finance, Revenue & Bonding and Environment Committees.

Members

Deputy Commissioner William P. Shea
Connecticut State Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection (DESPP), Middletown, CT
Appointed by DESPP Commissioner Reuben F. Bradford; representing a commissioner or designee

Bio: Mr. Shea is the Deputy Commissioner, Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection, where he is responsible for directing the department's Division of Emergency Management and Homeland Security. A retired US Army Colonel with more than 32 years of service, Mr. Shea also serves as a member of the School Security and Safety Planning Workgroup the School Safety Infrastructure Council and Homeland Security Advisor to the Governor.

Commissioner Stefan Pryor
Connecticut State Department of Education (SDE), Hartford, CT
Representing a commissioner or designee

Bio: Mr. Pryor is the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Education. Mr. Pryor previously served as deputy mayor for economic development in Newark, N.J.; as a leader of the Lower Manhattan Development Corporation, which was created in the aftermath of September 11, 2001; and as the vice president for education at the Partnership for New York City, where he led the organization's public education efforts and served as executive director of its main school reform program.

John Woodmansee, CIH, CUSA
Education Consultant - Environmental Health and Safety
Connecticut Department of Education (SDE) CT Technical High School System
Appointed by SDE Commissioner Stefan Pryor; representing a commissioner or designee

Bio: Mr. Woodmansee has more than 22 years of experience in the safety field, working in educational institutions, general industry and construction environments. He is the Education Consultant for Security, Environmental, Health & Safety for the Department of Education and is a member of the School Security and Safety Planning Workgroup. Mr. Woodmansee was also the Supervisor of Nuclear Site Safety for Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, and a senior environmental consultant.

Richard E. Morris
Director of Public Safety and Emergency Management, Town of East Lyme
Appointed by President Pro Tempore Donald E. Williams, Jr.; representing an expert in building security

Bio: Mr. Morris is the Fire Marshal and Director of Public Safety and Emergency Management for the Town of East Lyme. Mr. Morris is a member and past chair of the NFPA 303 Marinas and Boatyards Committee, a member of the NFPA 1033 Qualifications for Fire Investigators Committee, Past President of the Connecticut Fire Marshall's Association (CFMA), and the current Vice President of IAAI Connecticut Chapter.

Frank J. Costello, Jr, P.E.
Structural Engineer, Hamden, CT
Appointed by Speaker of the House J. Brendan Sharkey; representing a licensed professional engineer who is a structural engineer

Bio: Mr. Costello is a member of the American Institute of Steel Construction and the Structural Engineers Coalition of Connecticut. Throughout his 33 year career, he has acquired extensive experience designing various schools throughout the state, including the University of Connecticut, Southern Connecticut State University, Fairchild Wheeler Multi-Magnet School, Plainfield High School, Barnum Elementary School, Thomas Edison Middle School and many others.

Ronald Jakubowski
Former Asst. Superintendent of Schools for Operations and Facilities, New Britain, CT
Appointed by Senate Majority Leader Martin M. Looney; representing a certified public school administrator

Bio: Mr. Jakubowski is a recently retired educator with more than 39 years of experience in public education. His experience includes that of a teacher, principal, and Assistant Superintendent and Acting Superintendent of New Britain schools.

Steven Waznia
Firefighter, Berlin, CT
Appointed by House Majority Leader Joe Aresimowicz; representing a firefighter, emergency medical technician or paramedic

Bio: Mr. Waznia currently serves as Fire Marshal and Director of Risk Management for the Town of Berlin. He has more than 32 years of experience in the public safety field including fire suppression, investigation, code enforcement and development, hazardous materials and risk management.

Adam Byington
Police Officer, Fairfield, CT
Appointed by Senate Minority Leader John McKinney; representing a school resource officer (police officer assigned to a school)

Bio: Mr. Byington is a Police Officer in the town of Fairfield, and a certified School Resource Officer at Fairfield Ludlowe High School. He is a current and founding member of the Fairfield Police Department's School Safety Unit. Officer Byington received his B.S. in Criminal Justice from Roger Williams University.

Irene Roman
Public School Teacher, Waterbury, CT
Appointed by House Minority Leader Lawrence F. Cafero; representing a certified public school teacher

Bio: Ms. Roman is the Head Teacher at Frisbie Elementary School in Wolcott, Connecticut, and is currently teaching second grade. She received her B.A. in Psychology from Quinnipiac University and her M.S. in Elementary Education from the University of Bridgeport.

Staff

John Woodmansee, CIH, CUSA
In addition to being selected as Commissioner Pryor's Designee, John also participated as a staff member for the SSIC.
Title: Education Consultant - Environmental Health and Safety
Agency: Department of Education

Jason Crisco
Title: Executive Assistant to the Commissioner
Agency: Department of Administrative Services

Craig Russell
Title: Director, State & School Construction Support Services
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Division of Construction Services

Craig Smith, R.A.
Title: Architectural Design Reviewer 2
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Division of Construction Services

Jenna Padula
Title: Staff Attorney
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Division of Construction Services

Ken Rigney
Title: Sergeant, Critical Infrastructure Unit Supervisor
Agency: Office of Counter Terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Unit, Connecticut State Police, Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection

Mike Grieder
Title: Detective, Critical Infrastructure Unit
Agency: Office of Counter Terrorism, Critical Infrastructure Unit, Connecticut State Police, Department of Emergency Services & Public Protection

Brenda Bergeron, Esq.
Title: Principal Attorney
Agency: Department of Emergency Services and Public Protection

Additional Staff

Nina Ritson
Communications Specialist
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Communications

Cindy Ruszyk
Administrative Assistant
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Communications

John McKay
Communications Specialist
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Communications

Michael Guimond
Duplicating Services Supervisor 2
Agency: Department of Administrative Services, Communications

Appendix C

SCHOOL SAFETY INFRASTRUCTURE COUNCIL – MINUTES

The School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC) met a total of ten times over the course of an eight month period. The Minutes provided in this Appendix accurately describes each of the Informational Sessions and Special Meetings conducted by the SSIC during that time. These Minutes are provided as a timeline and overview of the discussions, testimony and decisions that took place before and by the SSIC.
School Safety Infrastructure Council – Minutes Archive
http://das.ct.gov/cr1.aspx?page=431

Minutes – May 31, 2013

Meeting Location: Legislative Office Building – Room 1A
Topics Covered: General introduction of members and staff. Review of legislative charge and proposed timeline.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%205_31_2013.pdf

Minutes – June, 25 2013

Meeting Location: Legislative Office Building – Room 1A
Topics Covered: The Council heard expert testimony from the State Building Inspector, the Director of the region's National Fire Protection Association; the Director of the State's Emergency Management - "all hazards" Planning Group and representatives of the state's Office of Counter Terrorism.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%206_25_2013a.pdf
Speakers:

- Joseph Cassidy, Acting State Building Inspector - Connecticut Department of Construction Services
- Robert Duval, New England Regional Director and James Dolan, Director of the NFPA Fire Code Field Office - National Fire Protection Association
- William J. Hackett, State Emergency Management Director, DEMS/DESPP
- Sergeant Ken Rigney and Detective Mike Grieder - DESPP Office of Counter Terrorism

Minutes – July, 15 2013

Meeting Location: Legislative Office Building – Room 1A
Topics Covered: First of three public informational sessions, the Council heard from design and architectural professionals from across the state, lock experts and representatives demonstrating a new interactive-interoperable real time audio/visual communication system linking schools, public safety officials, first responders, hospitals, utility companies and others.

Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%207_15_2013.pdf
Speakers:

- Mutualink & Sonitrol
  - o Mark Hatten, CEO/Chairman - Mutualink
  - o Colin McWay, President/CFO - Mutualink
  - o Joe Mazzarella, Senior V.P. & Chief Legal Counsel - Mutualink
  - o Doug Curtiss, CEO – Sonitrol
- Doug Titus, Business Development Manager for Education at Assa Abloy
- Mila Kennett, Architect/Senior Program Mgr., High Performance Resiliency Program - US Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Division
- Robert Ducibella, Ducibella Venter & Santore
- Robert D. Mitchell, Mitchell Architectural Group, P.C.
- Brian Humes, Jacunski Humes

Minutes – August 8, 2013

Meeting Location: New Britain High School, New Britain, CT – Tercyak Lecture Hall
Topics Covered: The second SSIC public informational session was dedicated to hearing from educational professionals including testimony from the state's largest teacher unions, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) and the Connecticut State Education Association (CSEA) and also representatives of the Connecticut Federation of School Administrators, the Connecticut Association of Public School Superintendents, the Connecticut Association of Schools, the Connecticut Association of Boards of Education and the Connecticut Association of School Business Administrators.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%208_8_2013.pdf
Speakers:

- Ron Chivinski, Vice-President - American Federation of Teachers CT (AFT-CT)
- Jeff Leake, Vice-President - Connecticut Education Association (CEA)
- Gary Maynard, President - CT Federation of School Administrators (CFSA)
- Don Romoser CT Parent Teacher Student Association (CT PTSA)
- Joe Cirasuolo - Connecticut Association of Public School Superintendents (CAPSS)
- Karissa Niehoff - Connecticut Association of Schools
- Robert Rader - Connecticut Association of Boards of Education (CABE)
- Sharon Bruce - Connecticut Association of School Business Administrators (CASBO)

Minutes – September 26, 2013

Meeting Location: Macdonough School, Middletown, CT - Gymnasium
Topics Covered: The final public informational session included comments from public officials, police and fire professionals, first responders and members of the public. Testimony from the Hartford Chief of Police, Middletown Fire Chief and several members of the public focused on the need for effective real time emergency response communication systems, comprehensive emergency planning which balances the need for effective life safety codes compliance with planning for other threats, the need for locking devices on class room doors and various options concerning school windows, protective treatments and laminates.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%209_26_2013.pdf
Speakers:

- Police Chief James Rovella, Hartford CT
- Fire Chief Robert Kronenberger, Middletown CT
- Vincent Riccio, Security Consultant and Trainer – Security Academy of Connecticut
- Bill Letson, Armor Solutions Inc.
- Chris Olsen, Director of Safety and Security, East Lyme Schools – East Lyme, CT

Minutes – October 10, 2013

Meeting Location: State Education Resource Center, Middletown CT
Topics Covered: Review of testimony from each of the three public informational sessions. Discussion of timeline post public information gathering process, overview of Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) for schools and of School Facility Security Products and Services Day sponsored by the Connecticut School Construction Coalition.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%2010_10_2013.pdf

Minutes – October 17, 2013

Meeting Location: State Education Resource Center, Middletown, CT
Topics Covered: Continued discussion of IRVS for Schools. Early discussions of establishing guidelines for standards (Appendix A) by Council members and staff.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes%2010_17_2013.pdf

Minutes – November, 7 2013

Meeting Location: DESPP Headquarters, Middletown, CT – Meeting Room 348
Topics Covered: In depth review and discussion of draft narrative report and standards (Appendix A). Identification of main components of standards (Appendix A).
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes_11_07_2013.pdf

Minutes – November 20, 2013

Meeting Location: DESPP Headquarters, Middletown, CT – Meeting Room 348
Topics Covered: Continued review of updated versions of the draft narrative report and standards (Appendix A). Discussion of other appendices to be included in final report. Overview of SSIC CT Delegation trip to Washington D.C. for two-day work-group with the U.S. Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Division, National Institute of Buildings Sciences, State of Texas, State of Michigan and U.S. Department of Education.
Link: http://das.ct.gov/images/1090/SSIC_Minutes_11_20_2013.pdf

Minutes – December 3. 2013

Meeting Location: DESPP Headquarters, Middletown, CT – Meeting Room 348
Topics Covered: Final review and approval of School Safety Infrastructure report.
Link: To be added

Appendix D

INTEGRATED RAPID VISUAL SCREENING FOR SCHOOLS AND NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES CHECKLIST OVERVIEW

The School Safety Infrastructure Council (SSIC) recognizes that an "all hazards" approach to assessment and design is paramount in determining the risk and resilience of school building infrastructure to both man-made and natural hazards. The SSIC has also determined that in order to develop comprehensive school safety infrastructure standards, a uniform risk assessment tool is needed to ensure a threshold level of awareness, responsiveness and security. The Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) for School Safety Project uses an "all-hazards" approach which incorporates over 30 hazard scenarios to facilitate the design and assessment of schools.

The SSIC has chosen the automated version of the IRVS for Schools as the preferred assessment tool to be used for Connecticut school building projects subject to the SSIC standards. The IRVS for Schools was created based on the National Clearing House for Educational Facilities (NCEF) checklist. A large number of the NCEF checklist components are included and expanded upon in the IRVS for Schools. However, the IRVS for School Safety program is currently in development and is not anticipated to be completed until after the SSIC's deadline of January 1, 2014. Therefore, in the interim, until the automated IRVS for School Safety Project is ready for use by states and school districts, the SSIC recommends that the NCEF checklist should be utilized.

INTEGRATED RAPID VISUAL SCREENING (IRVS) FOR SCHOOL SAFETY OVERVIEW

The Building Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) is a multi-volume publication created by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Resilient Systems Division (RSD) http://www.dhs.gov/high-performance-and-integrated-design-resilience-program. The BIPS series serves to advance high performance and integrated design for buildings and infrastructure across all sectors. The series was born as a result of the events of September 11, 2001, to protect our Nation's most crucial assets. It includes multiple volumes tailored to specific areas: Mass Transit Systems; Tunnels; and Federal and Commercial Buildings.

In response to the tragic school shooting incidents that have taken place at Sandy Hook Elementary School and at other schools across the country, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Science and Technology (S&T) Directorate has begun development of the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening (IRVS) Process to Assess and Design Schools, which will be made available to all states and school districts at no cost. Connecticut has played an integral role in the preparation of the assessment tool with U.S. DHS to meet the needs of its educational system; develop guidance that helps the design community to design and build better schools; and set threshold requirement scores that all new school construction and

renovate as new projects should meet to ensure a safe environment for students and teachers. The IRVS for Schools is currently in draft manual form. Once completed and transformed into digital format, it will become part of the Buildings and Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) as the twelfth module in the series. DHS anticipates that the tool will be completed sometime in early to mid 2014.

The IRVS for School Safety is a modified version of the IRVS of Buildings (BIPS 04), which was created to assess the risk and resiliency of commercial buildings (excluding schools) and is the product of multiple partnerships. DHS S&T worked with various public and private sector entities to develop the IRVS methodology. The validation process of the IRVS methodology was conducted through a series of alpha and beta tests and a pilot test program of selected municipalities. The pilot test cities included Arlington, VA; Albany, NY; New York, NY; Washington, D.C.; Los Angeles, CA; Charleston, SC; and Chicago, IL. Equally important, the IRVS for School Safety methodology is based on the risk management process identified by the Interagency Security Committee for federal security professionals responsible for protecting nonmilitary federal facilities in the United States adapted for school buildings. The complete IRVS for School methodology will be comprised of software, and a manual, based on the Integrated Rapid Visual Screening Series (IRVS) for Commercial Buildings (BIPS 04), "Primer to Design Safe School Projects in Case of Terrorist Attacks and School Shootings" (BIPS 07), and the "Integrated Rapid Visual Screening: Interagency Security Committee (ISC) Screening Module" (BIPS 11).

BIPS 04: http://www.dhs.gov/bips-04-integrated-rapid-visual-screening-series-irvs-buildings
BIPS 07: https://www.dhs.gov/bips-07-primer-design-safe-school-projects-case-terrorist-attacks-and-school-shootings-2nd-edition
BIPS 11: Is currently only "For Official Use Only" and not viewable by the public.
The IRVS ISC version, in which the IRVS for Schools has its foundation, is currently being used by 32 federal and state entities, including but not limited to the following:

- St. Claire County, Michigan
- State of New York
- New York City Police Department
- Port Authority of Long Beach, CA
- U.S. Department of the Interior – Bureau of Indian Affairs
- U.S. Department of Homeland Security Immigration and Customs Enforcement
- U.S. Department Federal Protective Service Division National Protection and Program Management Directorate
- U.S. Department of Defense Threat Reduction Agency
- Smithsonian Institution
- U.S. Department of Justice – U.S. Marshall's Office
- U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
- U.S. General Services Administration

The ISC standards can be characterized as performance-based design standards (PBD), which are used to achieve specific performance levels for predetermined building components

in order to reach desired results. These requirements outline what the required level of performance is and allow end users the ability to determine the best course of action to mitigate the risk. This performance-based design approach varies from a prescriptive design approach, which is found in most building codes, and states exactly how something is to be done. Implicitly, PBD endorses the use of higher standards in lieu of the limited safety standards generally included in U.S. building codes. In terms of the School Safety Project, it is anticipated that the performance-based design approach will allow schools to be designed at a higher performance level with a greater amount of flexibility and cost effective returns. Once completed, the IRVS for Schools tool will allow for a quick and efficient way to quantify the risk and resilience of a single school or a group of school buildings through an "all-hazards" approach. "All-hazards" encompasses all man-made (as applicable to schools) and selected natural hazards that are a threat to the operations of a school facility. The IRVS for Schools is intended to be used during the design phase of construction, or may be used to assess existing facilities to help determine a school's safety and security vulnerabilities, and further ascertain an efficient and cost effective course of action to increase the level of protection to mitigate the defined risk. The overall purpose of the IRVS School Safety Project is to enhance the resistance of our Nation's schools against multiple undesirable events and to meet specific performance requirements at the highest possible level.

Major Components of the IRVS for School Safety Project, as Modified by the SSIC:

- School Security Level: Attempts to quantify the level of risk that exists at a particular school as measured by potential casualties, building damage, restoration costs, etc., for each of the potential high risk threats identified in the Undesirable Event Analysis. This analysis establishes a baseline school security level.
- Undesirable Events: Encompasses all conditions, environmental or manmade, that have the potential to cause injury, illness, or death; damage to or loss of equipment, infrastructure services, or property; or social, economic, or environmental functional degradation to schools.
- Level of Protection: Allows for the identification of school vulnerabilities for each undesirable event and categorizes and rank measures them to serve as the basis for implementing protective measures for school safety.
- Compliance: Once a local school district has completed the assessment; identified potential vulnerabilities and proposed specific plans to remediate deficiencies and secure compliance, the Connecticut Department of Administrative Services Office of School Facilities Plan Review Unit will evaluate the local plan for adequacy and continue to work with local districts to ensure compliance with established safety and security standards.

IRVS NEXT STEPS

In order to expedite the adoption of IRVS for School Safety Project, the U.S. DHS and its partners have established an informal review committee for the preparation of the manual. This committee will be responsible for launching a standardized and categorized

methodology for risk assessment, applicable to all schools, to enhance the quality and effectiveness of physical security nationwide. All documentation and software related to the IRVS for Schools Safety Project is currently For Official Use Only (FOUO) and viewable only by those involved in the IRVS Committee Standing Partnership.

IRVS Committee Standing Partnership

- U.S. DHS Science and Technology Directorate
- U.S. Department of Education
- School Safety Infrastructure Council of Connecticut
- Katy Independent School District of Texas
- State of Michigan

NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES (NCEF) CHECKLIST

The NCEF checklist is currently in use by Connecticut's School Security Competitive Grant Program. All Connecticut public schools are eligible for the program. A school must complete the entire NCEF checklist before its security infrastructure costs may be eligible for state reimbursement through the program.

The NCEF checklist is designed for assessing the safety and security of school buildings and grounds. Created by the National Clearinghouse for Educational Facilities and funded by the U.S. Department of Education's Office of Safe and Drug-Free Schools, the checklist combines the nation's best school facility assessment measures into one comprehensive online source. Nationally recognized school facility and safety experts participated in the checklist's creation.

The checklist embodies the three principles of Crime Prevention through Environmental Design (CPTED): natural surveillance, the ability to easily see what is occurring in a particular setting; natural access control, the ability to restrict who enters or exits an environment; and territoriality-maintenance, the ability to demonstrate ownership of and respect for property.

Although the NCEF checklist project is fully operational, it's funding was terminated as of September 1, 2012, the SSIC is recommending it as the preferred assessment tool until the IRVS for School Safety Project is complete. The NCEF checklist is still the most widely recognized checklist available.

Appendix E

TECHNICAL COMPLIANCE GUIDELINES OVERVIEW

The Technical Compliance Guidelines provide recommendations that are intended to foster proper design and management of the facility, maintain an open, inviting, pleasant environment for teaching and learning, while ensuring a safer environment for students and faculty. Using an "all hazards" approach to assessment and design, these guidelines expand upon the nine identified Critical Compliance areas from Appendix A, in addition to other areas that require greater flexibility with regard to compliance. Due to its comprehensive nature and technical content, the guidelines remain a work-in-progress and will require further development before being released. Once complete, the actual guidelines will be incorporated into the SSIC final report as an updated and free standing Appendix E to be used by design and architectural professionals.

The Technical Compliance Guidelines will be applicable to all (state funded) public school construction projects, including but not limited to: (1) New Construction, (2) Renovation (C.G.S. Sec. 10-282(18), (3) Alterations, (4) Extensions (Additions).
The document is intended to: (1) Provide comprehensive guidance for the facility owners in bridging the "Assessment to Compliance" process. (2) Serve as a guide to determine the necessary level of protection required addressing identified deficiencies from the Level Of Protection (LOP) Analysis of the facility assessment. (3) Provide a set of guidance materials with a range of options as to how best to cost effectively modify existing facilities or incorporate in the design of a new facility. (4) Facilitate the use of cross-referencing of various Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Building Infrastructure Protection Series (BIPS) documents or parts thereof (from the assessment process) to assist in the proper mitigation approach. (5) Suggest specification language for design professionals to incorporate as a part of the construction documentation.

Instead of confusing the user with the various principles of crime prevention or building design, this document applies a more straight-forward approach. By identifying the various facility elements, coupled with current recognized industry standards, listed with optional choices, and how-to/where-to guidance, the user can pick and choose the best approach, applicable to the specific facility. This document was developed to incorporate a reasonable performance-based response as well as guidance towards an acceptable mitigation approach. The guidelines and recommendations provided in this document are not intended to supersede or take precedence over any current state or federal laws, codes or standards.
The desired school design should: (1) Protect against natural and man-made hazards. (2) Provide for a safe, healthy, comfortable, and secure environment. (3) Develop an enhanced, inviting learning environment. (4) Allow flexibility to also serve as a center of the community. (5) Consider Energy efficiency wherever applicable.

After an assessment has been completed, the assessment team should identify the critical areas of deficiencies and, using the LOP Chart, select the appropriate item(s) matching the desired resistance value(s) to determine/select the applicable standard for that item. That item and standard can then be conveyed to the proposed project's design team to incorporate when developing the set of construction documents that will be released for bidding purposes and eventually constructed. These items will not be subject to Value-Engineering, without prior review and approval by the DAS/OSF. Any proposed substitution must be deemed equivalent to the minimum standard established by the School Safety Infrastructure Council, before it is allowed as a substitution.

Many existing facilities may be unable to meet these guidelines and/or recommendations, as existing geographical, structural, architectural, mechanical, electrical, or other infrastructure systems may pose limitations for full compliance. However, if the options offered in this document do not adequately address the individual facility's needs, the owner may seek advice, regarding alternatives, from the Office of School Facilities Technical Review Unit, or seek a waiver of a particular established Standard from the Commissioner of Administrative Services.